THE BAHAMAS
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMISSION
PRELIMINARY REPORT
& PROVISIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 2006
Royal Victoria
Gardens East Hill Street, Nassau, Bahamas - March, 2006
Foreword
i. The
members of the Commission are acutely aware that
this
report does not constitute the completion of its review of the Constitution.
It is only
a preliminary report, and its suggestions are not yet recommendations which will be contained in the Final Report. There is
to be a further round of public consultation on the suggestions and ideas contained in this report before the Final Report
will be submitted to Government. That Report will contain in greater detail the Commission’s reasoning for its recommendations
as well as fuller treatment of the public’s submissions.
ii. Although
the Commission has given careful thought and
consideration
to the many views canvassed, this report is not a simple
recording or reporting of the views of Bahamians who participated
in the review process. To be sure, it contains a distillation of public
opinion, but this is refracted through the lens of the Commission.
This is as it should be, for constitutional principles cannot be shaped
by majority views alone. Constitutions are frequently concerned
with the protection of individual rights and freedoms, and the control
of arbitrary political power in a democracy.
iii. This
is not to suggest, however, that there was any consensus
of opinions or homogeneity of thought emanating from the
public. The Commission was pleased to find a diversity of thinking
and a liberal tolerance for contending views that can only be representative
of a vigorous and robust democracy. Neither was there
unanimity of thought among the members of the Commission.
Although the Commission was able to produce a unified report,
members expressed dissenting views on those areas where their
views differed strongly from those of other members.
iv. Members
of the Commission were at pains throughout the
review
process to explain that the primary purpose of the questions
in the booklet “Options for Change” was to stimulate discussion.
Thus, the Commission does not attempt to answer each of the
questions posed, but merely hopes to paint with a broad brush and
deal with the essential issues. It realizes that many consequential
amendments, both within the new constitutional document itself and
related legislation, will be necessary if the Commission’s suggestions
become recommendations and are implemented. In the main,
these consequential changes are not dealt with here, and have
been deferred to a later stage of the constitutional review process.
v. The
Commission hopes that its report is received as a document
that proposes positive changes for those aspects of our
Constitution that have been found to be defective or lack merit, and
leaves intact those portions which have served us well. Those who
were expecting a wholesale rewriting of the Constitution or radical
departure from some of the fundamental principles and conventions
of Westminster government will be disappointed. In developing its
provisional recommendations, the Commission was guided by its
terms of reference, which required it to retain the system of parliamentary
democracy.
SECTION
1
Major themes
which arose in consultations
and Public Meetings
1.1 In
this section, the Commission encapsulates the main
subjects
and concerns addressed by the public and their thinking on
these issues. Many of these matters are elaborated on in the following
chapters.
1.2 Throughout
its consultations, several topics and issues
arose
with sufficient recurrence and preeminence to be considered
as themes. It is likely that some of these viewpoints were influenced
by the questions posed in the booklet “Options for Change”,
the political platform indications for constitutional change, and the
2002 Constitutional Referenda Acts. But the Commission is also
convinced that many had their origin in the common experience and
shared perception of Bahamians, from vastly different social, economic
and educational backgrounds. Several of these concerns
are, strictly speaking, outside the remit of a constitutional review
exercise. But they come within the context of general political or
governmental reforms, and hence share a close affinity with the
functioning of the constitutional and basic legal order of society.
1.3 Some
of the common themes, which are not presented in
any
order of precedence, are as follows:
The early
town meetings of the Commission held in New
Providence
and the Family Islands were dominated by a discussion
of
the Preamble, and there was unanimous support for retaining the
Preamble in its current form. This single topic would have controlled
the agenda of the town meetings had the Commission not come to
an early recognition that the people would support no change to the
Preamble. A policy decision was taken by the Commission to reassure
audiences of this position, and steer the discussion away from
an inordinate focus on the Preamble.
By and
large people felt the enormous powers of the Prime Minister,
whether real or perceived, had to be limited without affecting the
Prime Minister’s authority. It was their view that there should be
greater opportunity for the involvement of civil society before the
exercise of executive power.
There were
many criticisms leveled at the devotion to duty provided
by some Members of Parliament, and many persons expressed the
view that there should be some system for penalizing or recalling
delinquent representatives.
Generally,
there was not any great dissatisfaction with the basic
system of parliamentary democracy and the two-chambered
Parliament (elected House of Assembly and appointed Senate.)
However, there was widespread agreement with the need for reform
of the Senate to make it a more mature representative body with
membership drawn from broader segments of the community.
Many persons expressed the view that the Senate should be an
elected body, but without altering its powers; others felt that some
Senators should have security of tenure.
There were
mixed feelings about the retention of the Queen of
England
as Queen of the Bahamas and Head of State of The
Bahamas.
There was a significant number of persons who
expressed
no opinion as to the institution of Monarchy; there were
others who were of the opinion that the status quo should remain,
while others were of the view that this link to the British Monarchy
was inconsistent with Bahamian independence and sovereignty and
should be severed while preserving membership with the
Commonwealth of which the Queen is symbolic Head.
There was
overwhelming support for equality between the sexes
and
for the removal of any form of discrimination on the grounds of
sex or gender, especially with regard to the ability of a married
Bahamian woman to transmit citizenship to her child born outside
the Bahamas. So far as acquisition of citizenship by marriage is
concerned, the majority of persons felt that acquisition should not be
automatic for either non-Bahamian males or females, and that a
waiting period would be appropriate for both. There was wide
divergence between persons regarding the time period for the grant
of citizenship ranging from those who preferred 5 or 10 years, to
those who said “never” and others “automatic” on marriage.
There was
wide support for the elimination of discrimination on the
basis of sex or gender with respect to citizenship but almost unanimous
opposition and rejection of the concept of same-sex marriage,
in the face of a determined minority committed to the concept of
absolute non-discrimination. Emerging out of this discussion, the
majority of persons would wish Bahamian law of marriage as a
union between a man and a woman to be enshrined in the
Constitution.
There were
concerns generally over the need for greater participation
of civil society in the process of governance, and for
Governments to be more overtly accountable to the people for their
policies and actions and more forthcoming.
There was
a common concern that the government did not have
command
of the immigration situation, and most people thought to
some degree this was linked with the state of the citizenship and
immigration laws. In particular, there was concern over the status
of children born in the Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents.
A large
number of Family Island persons resonated a call for greater
autonomy in Local Government and for the Constitution to specify
the relationship between the Central and Local Government. A realistic
study of the governmental needs of the more developed islands
and the less developed should be undertaken.
SECTION
2
GENERAL
FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION
Enactment of the Constitution
2.1 The
method by which the new Constitution will enter into
force
was not a subject that attracted the attention of a significant
number of persons. This is understandable because it raises highly
sophisticated defining issues of politics, law, national identity,
emotion, symbolism and sovereignty. At the heart of the matter is
how we would disengage ourselves from our imperial past.
2.2 There
is a persuasive constitutional argument to be made
for
the enactment of the new Constitution by amendment, as an
enactment by statute law of The Sovereign Bahamian Parliament
would be said to be symbolic only.
2.3 On
the other hand, the technical remote possibility that the
United Kingdom Parliament would repeal the Order in Council conferring
Independence on the Bahamas is a remote possibility verging
on the impossible; the Order remains a device structured, not by
Bahamians, but by an Imperial power. Symbolic though it might be,
should not the Constitution of the Bahamas be a product of
Bahamians?
2.4 Both
the Jamaican Constitutional Reform Report in 1995
and
the Barbadian Constitution Review Commission in 1998 opted
for an enactment by their Sovereign Parliaments. In the case of
Jamaica, the Commission suggested that the British Government
be invited to revoke the Jamaican Independence Order simultaneously
with the coming into force of the new Jamaican Constitution.
§
Provisional
Recommendation(s)
(1.) The
Commission recommends that reforms to the
present
Constitution be achieved by repealing the Order-in-
Council
(Bahamas Independence Order) to which the
Constitution
of the Bahamas is scheduled, and simultaneously
replacing
it with an Act of the Parliament of The Bahamas entitled
the Bahamas Constitution Act, subsequently approved by
Referendum.
The Preamble
2.5 One
of the most riveting topics during the early phase of
the
public debate on constitutional reform was the wording of the
Preamble. Indeed, it is correct to say that, with the possible exception
of the discussion revolving around sexual orientation and citizenship
in the immigrant context, no other aspect of the Constitution
came close to generating the kind of attention as the Preamble.
2.6 At
issue was the question of whether consideration should
be given to changing the Preamble to avoid any appearance of a
constitutional bias towards Christianity, notwithstanding the substantive
guarantees of freedom of religion in the fundamental rights
provisions.
2.7 As
far as its approach to religion is concerned, it might be
said that the Preamble is all-embracing and does not necessarily
favour any particular religion. The Commission, is not of the view
that the reference to “Christian values” is exclusionary of or discriminatory
against other religions. Even if it could be interpreted as
being pro-Christianity, there could be nothing wrong with the
framers of the Constitution stating in the Preamble what they
thought should be the defining spiritual basis of the State. The
important thing is that the Constitution itself guarantees freedom of
religion to all, which is unimpeded by anything in the Preamble.
§
Provisional
Recommendation(s)
(2.) The
Commission recommends that the Preamble be
retained
in its current form and that no amendments be made
to
its content.
Directive
Principles of State
2.8 In
the exercise of our function as Constitutional
Commissioners,
we considered whether the Bahamas ought to
adopt
the concept of directive principles of state or directive principles
of social policy, which have been adopted in several European
countries, a Commonwealth country and at least one Caribbean
country (i.e) Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, India and
Guyana). The Barbadian Constitutional Review Commission recommended
that a broad statement of principles defining the general
policy framework within which Barbados would be governed
should be included in the reformed Constitution of Barbados. The
Commission will give further consideration to whether or not similar
principles should be included in the reformed Bahamian
Constitution. Attached as an Annex is a sample of such principles
recommended by the Barbadian Report of their Constitutional
Review Commission.
Amending
the Constitution
Entrenchment devices
2.9 The
majority of the provisions of the Constitution of The
Bahamas
can only be changed by an act of the Legislature with a
2/3 or ? majority and supported by referendum. Significantly, these
entrenchment devices also extend to provisions of the
Independence Order and the Independence Act. A noted
Caribbean constitutional scholar, Francis Alexis, has pointed out
that the purpose for the entrenchment devices was to ensure that
changes to the Constitution could “not be brought about by accident”.
2.10 Consideration
has to be given to the question of whether
there
should be removal of certain Articles of the Constitution or
what new provisions should be added to the list of entrenched
Articles for example, (i) the right to Vote, (ii) Leader of the
Opposition (Not now entrenched) or (iii) that the Bahamas be a
Democratic Parliamentary Republic.
§
Provisional
Recommendation(s)
The Commission
is of the view that there is a need for greater
in
depth study and wider consultation on these entrenched
provisions before any specific recommendations are made
which ought not to be done until all significant Articles of the
new Constitution are agreed to be recommended.
SECTION
3
SPECIFIC
CHAPTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Chapter
I: Supreme Law Clause
The Supreme Law Clause
3.1 The
importance of the supreme law clause is that it specifically
declares the primacy of the Constitution, although the case
law indicates that even without such a specific declaration the
Constitution would be supreme. There are two very important consequences
that flow from this: firstly, it creates a system of constitutional
supremacy, where Parliament is subject to the Constitution,
as opposed to the British system of Parliamentary supremacy.
Second, it provides the written basis for the superior courts to
review and question the legality of primary legislation against the
standard of the Constitution at the request of an aggrieved person.
§
Provisional
Recommendation(s)
(4.) The
Commission recommends the retention of the
Supreme
Law Clause. Any person (whether aggrieved or not),
with
the leave of the Court may be given the right to challenge
the validity of any law in the Court which may be ultra vires the
Constitution and given such declaration and redress as may be
appropriate.
Chapter
II: Citizenship
3.2 The
principles which are to govern the grant of citizenship
in a small country occupying the geo-strategic space of The
Bahamas must be carefully conceived. They must be conceived
with compassion for the rights of others and regard for international
legal principles, but realistically to protect our identity and culture as
Bahamians. The issue which consumed the people most was who
should be made citizens under the Constitution.
3.3 It
appeared to be the view of the majority of those who
expressed
opinions on the Constitution that gender bias, wherever
it applies to the acquisition or transmission of citizenship, should be
removed.
§
Provisional Recommendation(s)
(5.) It
must be ensured that every person who at the commencement
of the Constitution was a lawful citizen of The
Bahamas should continue to be a citizen. It should also be
ensured that no person with vested rights with respect to citizenship
should have that right adversely affected.
(6.) Different
treatment accorded to non-Bahamian spouses
of Bahamian
citizens, or gender discrimination should be
deleted
from relevant provisions of the Constitution. The
Constitution
should provide that non-national spouses of
Bahamian
citizens should be treated equally. Such persons
upon
marriage should have a right to reside and work in the
Bahamas and own property jointly and upon application the
right to become a Bahamian citizen 5 years after marriage subject
to such exceptions or qualifications as may be prescribed
in the interests of national security or public policy.
(7.) The
Commission recommends that the Constitutional
provision
which provides for children born outside The
Bahamas
to married Bahamian men have automatic Bahamian
citizenship,
should also provide for children born outside the
Bahamas
to married Bahamian women (regardless of the
nationality
of their spouse) to have the same automatic entitlement
to citizenship.
(8.) With
respect to the position of children born in The
Bahamas
to non-Bahamians, the Commission recommends
that
the waiting period be 18 years of permanent residence.
This provision should import the international law criteria of
the “genuine link” for the applicant to qualify for registration.
These changes would ensure that only those persons who are
able to demonstrate that their attachment, in terms of their family,
social relations, and other interests are in the Bahamas and
not elsewhere would qualify. The Commission recommends
that persons born in the Bahamas neither of whose parents is
a Bahamian should be entitled to citizenship upon attaining the
age of 18 provided that the person was ordinarily resident in
the Bahamas for a period of not less than 10 years immediately
prior to his attaining the age of 18 subject to such exceptions
or qualifications as may be prescribed in the interest of national
security or public policy. This right to citizenship should be
lost if no application is made before the person attains the age
of twenty-one.
(9.) With
respect to the ability of children born in The
Bahamas
to acquire citizenship if either parent is Bahamian
(the
situation described by Article 6 of the Constitution), a proviso
should be added to make it clear that the entitlement to
pass on citizenship applies equally to both parents, except that
proof of paternity is required where the unmarried parent is a
Bahamian male. That parent must prove paternity by means
of a Declaration of Paternity from the Supreme Court as prescribed
by Parliament.
(10.) The
position of children born outside The Bahamas to
unmarried
Bahamian parents, male or female, should be the
same
and should provide for the automatic acquisition of citizenship,
subject to proof of paternity in the case of the
Bahamian male by a Declaration of Paternity from the Supreme
Court as prescribed by Parliament. If men and women are
granted the same ability to transmit their citizenship, and the
citizenship provisions proclaim true gender equality, it would
eliminate the need to equate the status of an unmarried mother
to that of a father, in respect of children born outside The
Bahamas.
(11.) The
position with respect to dual citizenship or nationality
should be stated, and persons who are eligible for
Bahamian citizenship should not be denied registration simply
because they possess another nationality. However, renunciation
of another citizenship should be made a condition-precedent
to the grant of citizenship.
Chapter
III: Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms
3.4 It
was no surprise to the Commission that the fundamental
rights provisions in the Constitution attracted significant debate and
discussion. From the perspective of the citizen, this must be the
most important feature of the Constitution. The most interesting
debate focused around the non-discrimination clause, in particular
the apparent uncertainty of the Constitution to non-discrimination on
the grounds of sex (or gender).
Discrimination
on the grounds of “sex”
3.5 There
is an inherent tension that exists between the preambular
Article 15, which grants certain basic rights to persons
regardless of race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or
sex, and the enumerated rights that follow from Article 16 to Article
27. The conflict arises from the inclusion of “sex” as a basic right
to which a person is entitled in Article 15, and its omission from the
particular article designed to protect against discrimination (Article
26). This leads to the conclusion that the Constitution does not
explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex. Article 26
also excludes from the protection against discrimination matters of
personal law (adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of
property on death) and discriminatory laws “reasonably justified in a
democratic society”. Interestingly, the Status of Children’s Act,
also exempts adoption, inheritance, domicile and citizenship.
Principle
of gender equality
3.6 The
Commission can hardly underscore the point that
equality
of treatment must be the cornerstone of our Constitution. It
is significant that the bill of rights in the 1999 South African constitution
begins with the simple proclamation that “Everyone is equal
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of
the law.” There can be no room in our Constitution for any omission
that permits persons of the female gender to be treated differently
from those of the male gender.
The right
to vote
3.7 The
Commission received several representations for the
right
to vote to be enshrined as one of the fundamental rights. It
cannot be denied that the right of a people to vote freely and secretly
to elect their representatives to Parliament is the very bedrock of
democracy. All of the other political powers of the state flow from
this act. The Commission is of the view that the right to vote and to
do so by secret ballot should be enshrined and entrenched in the
Constitution. Obviously, however, it needs to be appreciated that
unlike the other fundamental rights, which are granted basically to
“everyone within the Bahamas” the right to vote is a limited one, and
can only belong to citizens of the Bahamas.
Freedom
of the Press
3.8 The
Commission also heard from a number of advocates
for
freedom of the press, radio and television media to be included
as part of the principle of free expression. It cannot be denied that
a free and unbridled press is one of the most important institutions
in a democratic society, and may be deserving of constitutional protection.
Freedom of Information
3.9 A corollary
of the right of free speech is the right to have
access
to public information. The right of free expression embraces
the right to impart and receive information, and thus it is not surprising
that some Constitutions link the right of freedom of information
to that of free speech. Some provide for extensive rights of freedom
of information, such as the South African model, which provides
a right of access to information held by the state. Others do
not elevate it to a constitutional right, but have adopted freedom of
information laws.
§
Provisional
Recommendation(s)
(12.) The
Commission recommends that “sex” (gender) be
included in the protected category of enumerated rights in
Article 26 in the definition of “discriminatory”. The
Commission does not agree that “sexual orientation” deserves
special constitutional protection. We support the proposition
that the institution of marriage should be defined in the constitution
as a union between man and woman.
(13.) The
Commission does not recommend the elevation of
additional
factors such as language, age, handicap or disability
for
the non-discriminatory provision of the Constitution.
These
factors call for specific, limited protection, by separate
legislation.
(14.) The
right to vote in general elections and referenda by
citizens
of the Bahamas should be included in the constitution
subject
to whatever qualifications that may be necessary.
(15.) The
Commission recommends that Parliament prescribe
a Freedom
of Information Act.
Chapter
IV: The Governor-General
3.10 It
is apparent that the position of the Head of State of The
Bahamas is not seen in reality to be the Queen of Great Britain etc.
who constitutionally is the Queen of the Bahamas too. People
appear not to be troubled by the concept and are apparently satisfied
to regard the Governor-General, although wrongly, to be Head
of State of The Bahamas. The reaction to the proposition that the
Queen is constitutionally Queen of The Bahamas was usually met
with silence.
3.11 The
abolition of the English monarch as Head of State of
the
Bahamas is part of the evolutionary process toward a truly peoples
Government, not one of the Queen’s Dominions but part of the
Commonwealth. The Commission would wish the Bahamian people
to focus on whether the position of a “foreign monarch” and one
that is shared with many other countries, is reconcilable with the
founding provisions which state that the Bahamas shall be a “sovereign”
democratic state. We cannot on the one hand assert ourselves
as a sovereign country and a free and independent actor in
international affairs while relying on the legal fiction of “Her Majesty
in Parliament” and “Her Majesty’s Government” in the “speech
from
the throne” to give legitimacy to our
Government.
3.12 It
is conceded that in an increasingly interdependent world
the concept of sovereignty as it denotes a self-sufficient national territory
is waning; sovereignty must denote an independent legal entity,
where some supreme body has virtually unlimited capacity to
make-laws. Although the existence and validity of the rules in our
legal system are determined by reference to a written Constitution,
those laws still require the participation of “the Queen-in-Parliament”
to be properly enacted. This is inconsistent with being a completely
independent legal entity.
A local
Head of State
3.13 The
time has come for the transition to a Bahamian Head
of
State to be elected by both Houses of Parliament. This
Bahamian Head of State would function in a role similar to that of
the Queen’s Representative, the current Governor General, who
now exercises powers on behalf of the Queen of the Bahamas.
3.14 Another
curious point about the appointment of the
Governor-General
is that there is no requirement for the holder of
that
office to be a citizen of the Bahamas. Because of the method
of appointment of the Governor-General, it hardly seems logical that
the person appointed to this office would be a non-Bahamian. To
remove all doubt it should be declared that the Governor General or
Head of State shall be a Bahamian citizen.
§
Provisional
Recommendation(s)
(16.) The
Commission recommends that the English
Monarch shall
no longer be the Head of State of The Bahamas
and
the office of Governor General be abolished. The Head of
State should be a citizen of The Bahamas duly elected for a
term of years by both Houses of Parliament. The Bahamas
should be a Democratic Parliamentary Republic with the Head
of state being the President. Executive Powers shall continue
to be exercised by the Cabinet with the Head of Government
being the Prime Minister.
(17.) The
provision of the Constitution which permits the
Chief
Justice and the President of the Senate to serve as acting
Head of State should be removed to avoid a conflict of
interest. Deputies should be appointed from among eminent
citizens to fill any vacancies in that office.
Chapter
V: Parliament
Strengthening
the institutions of Parliament
3.15 Despite
the widespread criticisms of the function of the
Senate,
there was general agreement that the bi-cameral nature of
the Parliament should be retained.
3.16 The
Commission thinks it a point of substance that the
suggestion
to expand the Senate to provide for the representation
of the “islands” was the unique contribution primarily of the Family
Island participants, who were adamant that they should have a
voice in the Senate. This suggestion is reasonable, and while it is
obviously impractical to have individual island representation, this
could be achieved by means of sector representation (northern
islands, central islands, southeastern-islands, southern-islands).
§
Provisional
Recommendation(s)
(18.) The
Commission does not recommend any change in
the
system by which members of the House of Assembly are
elected.
The Parliamentary system should be modified to
make
allowance for representation in the Senate by members
without
political affiliation from special community institutions,
for example the church, trade unions, professional bodies,
commerce and other major fields of endeavour, although
the Government must maintain the majority. This will necessitate
an increase in the membership of the Senate.
(19.) The
Commission recommends that the membership of
the
senate should be increased to twenty-three (23) persons.
Twelve (12) senators appointed by the Prime Minister, six (6)
appointed by the Leader of the Opposition and five (5) appointed
by the Head of State acting in his own discretion from leading
citizens in the church, trade unions, professional bodies,
commerce, community organizations and other major fields of
endeavour after consultation with the Prime Minister and the
Leader
of the Opposition.
(20.) It
is recommended that the Constitution be amended
to
create a truly independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission
and remove the power of the Prime Minister to
modify
the report of the Commission. The office currently
styled
Parliamentary Commissioner should be the ex-officio
Chairman
of that Commission with constitutional protection
and
security of tenure similar to the Chairman of the other
Service Commissions together with 3 persons nominated by
the Prime Minister and 3 by the Leader of the Opposition (not
including members of Parliament). Decisions of the
Commission ought to be subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court.
(21.) The
Commission does not propose any interference
with
Parliamentary privilege of the timeless right of freedom of
speech of Members of the House of Assembly. However, this
freedom is sometimes abused by overt personal attacks on
persons who have no right of response in the House. It is recommended
that the Constitution provide for a written response
from any offended person to be published in Hansard with the
approval of the Speaker to prevent baseless or frivolous
responses.
(22.) The
Commission recommends that Parliament prescribe
controls
and limits over donations to political parties,
candidates
and political campaign expenditure to ensure transparency
and accountability in local and national elections and
fairness in referendum. The Commission suggests that there
be public funding provided by the Government for the cost of
referendum. It is also recommended that these limits apply to
non-Bahamians contributing to parties or candidates.
(23.) The
Commission recommends that an Integrity
Commission
be established under an Integrity in Public Life
Act,
that would serve as a watchdog committee over the affairs
of political and senior civil servants, and which will replace the
Public Disclosure Act. It is recommended that this Integrity
Commission, in addition to some of the provisions from the
Public Disclosure Act, shall provide that Members of
Parliament and Senior Public Officers disclose all business
interests, investments and shares in companies held by them
in which they are beneficial owners.
(24.) The
office of Clerk to Parliament, and a Deputy Clerk,
with
responsibility for the Senate, should be established by the
Constitution as public offices, with appropriate security of
tenure, and control over their staff.
Chapter
VI: Executive Powers
Cabinet
3.17 The
Cabinet of the Bahamas is charged with the direction
and
control of the Government of the Bahamas and is “collectively
responsible and answerable to Parliament.” Although this time honoured
tradition may have worked well in the context of British politics,
there are problems with it in the Caribbean. In this regard the
Commission bore in mind the advice of the Wooding Commission
that the executive powers in the Westminster system, especially in
small states, have “a propensity to become transformed……………………………….
in societies without political cultures
which support its operative conventions.”
3.18 The
Commission recommends that the committee system,
which
operates well in the United Kingdom and the United States,
be utilized to demand greater accountability of Government to the
House of Assembly from where it gets its support.. These committees
should be drawn from the House and they should be given real
powers, with the regular power of House committees (i.e., power to
send for persons and papers etc.). They can be a very valuable tool
in the democratic process if used effectively. These Committees
which have a Government majority ought to be studied in other jurisdictions
for their working in reality and in practice.
Powers
of the Prime Minister
3. 19 Under
our system the Prime Minister possesses a plenitude
of
powers that range from the ability to appoint (and therefore
some removals) the Governor General, and the appointment of
many senior persons, including senior judicial officers (Court of
Appeal, Chief Justice), Chairmen of most of the permanent commissions,
foreign representatives, Permanent Secretaries,
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police, etc.
3.20 There
was a nearly unanimous call for the reduction of
some
of the Prime Minister’s powers of appointment. The
Commission agrees with the suggestion that there should be
reforms in the procedures for the appointment of many of the offices
currently appointed by the Prime Minister. At the same time, while
it is possible to divest the Prime Minister of appointment powers